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Abstract
This paper aims to bridge philosophical and psychological research on causation, counterfactual
thought, and the problem of backtracking. Counterfactual approaches to causation such as that by
Lewis have ruled out backtracking, while on prominent models of causal inference interventionist
counterfactuals  do  not  backtrack.  However,  on  various  formal  models,  certain  backtracking
counterfactuals end up being true,  and psychological evidence shows that people do sometimes
backtrack  when  answering  counterfactual  questions  in  causal  contexts.  On  the  basis  of
psychological  research,  I  argue  that  while  ordinarily  both  kinds  of  counterfactuals  may  be
employed, non-backtracking counterfactuals are more easily used in causal inference because they
are consistent with temporal order information embedded in the mental simulation heuristic, and
they  match  reasoners’ experience  of  causation.  While  this  approach  is  incompatible  with  the
ambitions of counterfactual theories that seek to establish the non-backtracking interpretation as the
only legitimate one, it can provide support for perspectival views on causation and open further
inquiry on the functions of causal and counterfactual thought in the context of causal models.
Introduction
The counterfactual theory of causation has been a central contribution to 20th century metaphysics.
As the debate shifted from the ontological issue of what causation is to practice oriented questions,
such as causal inference and the normative dimension of reasoning, counterfactuals continue to play
a central role. Nevertheless, the question of backtracking arises in relation to both counterfactual
theories of causation and accounts of causal inference based on counterfactuals. While the direction
of  causation  is  in  line  with  the  direction  of  time,  counterfactuals  may  go both  ways.  Thus,  a
question arises regarding why only non-backtracking counterfactuals should be employed when
accounting  for  causal  dependence  or  making  cause-to-effect  inferences.  This  paper  uses
psychological evidence from causal reasoning to explain why non-backtracking counterfactuals are
easier to grasp for causal reasoners and largely used in connection to causal inference. I will argue
that  the  employment  of  mental  simulation  as  a  heuristic  in  causal  thought  involves  non-
backtracking counterfactuals due to its orientation from past to future. Furthermore, the experience
of causation and connected counterfactuals is marked by this framework.
This  article  aims  to  bridge  philosophical  and  psychological  work  on  counterfactuals,
explaining the intuitive appeal of non-backtracking counterfactuals, and their plausibility from a
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psychological perspective. As a contribution towards contemporary approaches to causation and
counterfactuals,  this  paper  highlights  the  importance  of  models  that  encompass  uses  of
backtracking,  and  their  integration  with  current  models  focusing  mainly  on  prediction.
Counterfactuals  going from past  to  future  are  plausible  given people’s  experience  of  time  and
causation,  but  other  uses  may  allow  for  backtracking,  as  illustrated  in  the  case  of  diagnostic
reasoning.  I  suggest  moving  beyond  the  perspective  going  back  to Lewis’ account  that  non-
backtracking counterfactuals are the right way of thinking about counterfactuals, while at the same
time setting a more modest claim of their usefulness in psychological context. This can be used in a
less metaphysically ambitious project of defining causality in relation to the perspective of the
causal reasoner.
I start by discussing the philosophical background for counterfactuals and causal models
highlighting  the  focus  on  the  non-backtracking  interpretation  in  philosophical  approaches  and
describing formal models according to which backtracking counterfactuals can come out as true
(section  2).  I  will  then  review counterfactual  thought  in  both  developmental  context  and adult
causal  reasoning  (section  3).  I  subsequently  discuss  backtracking  in  psychological  context,
providing  an  explanation  for  the  plausibility  of  the  non-backtracking  interpretation  of
counterfactuals in causal reasoning, and exploring further philosophical consequences in relation to
causal projectivism (section 4).
2. Causation, counterfactuals, and backtracking
In this section I review counterfactual analyses of causation highlighting the issue of backtracking
and its subsequent treatment in debates on counterfactuals, causation, and causal inference. From
this starting point I will sketch out the main questions to be addressed in the paper: on how formal
models can incorporate backtracking counterfactuals, on evidence regarding the use of backtracking
in  causal  thought,  on  why  it  makes  sense  for  causal  reasoners  to  use  non-backtracking
counterfactuals, and further consequences for the philosophy of causation.
The paradigmatic analysis of causation through counterfactual dependence was introduced
by Lewis (1974). Lewis’s complete analysis of causation is beyond my purposes here, and I will
focus on counterfactual dependence, which is sufficient (but not necessary) for causation on Lewis’
account. The truth of the claim ‘If A had not occurred, B would not have occurred’ is sufficient for
holding that A causes B. The truth values of counterfactuals are assessed through Lewis’s possible
world semantics, which is beyond my purposes here.1 Backtracking is introduced as an objection in
Lewis (1979), in relation to the project of analyzing both the direction of causation and the direction
1 See Lewis (1973).
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of time through counterfactual dependence. In short, the issue is that if one accepts that A causes B,
one  would  accept  the  counterfactual  (i)  ‘If  A had  not  occurred,  B  would  not  have  occurred’.
Nevertheless, one could also accept the counterfactual (ii) ‘If B had not occurred, A would not have
occurred’. This would hold in cases when one would take the absence of the effect event to be
indicative of the absence of the cause event. Lewis’ resolution is to provide an account according to
which only counterfactuals like (i)  are true,  and backtracking counterfactuals like (ii)  are false:
‘back-tracking arguments are mistaken: if the present were different the past would be the same, but
the same past causes would fail somehow to cause the same present effects (Lewis 1979: 457).
While  subsequent  debates  have  raised  other  objections  resulting  in  an  updated  view by Lewis
(2000), I will look instead at how counterfactuals are handled in the context of causal inference.
Woodward’s  (2003)  interventionist  approach  to  causation  has  a  central  counterfactual
component. Again, without going into the complexities of Woodward’s account, the upshot is that a
variable  A is  the  cause  of  another  variable  B within  a  variable  set  if  an  intervention  variable
changing the value of  A would also change the value of  B.2 It  should be pointed out  that  the
interventions  Woodward  describes  are  not  confined  to  actuality,  but  possibility.  This  brings
counterfactuals into the picture: ‘commitment to a manipulability theory leads unavoidably to the
use of counterfactuals concerning what would happen under conditions that may involve violations
of physical law’ (Woodward 2003: 132). For a discussion of backtracking,  further clarification is
needed in connection to Lewis’s account above. Woodward defines causation through a framework
of causal models, thus involving causal concepts, and, unlike Lewis, does not aim for a non-circular
account  of  causation.  The  definition  of  an  intervention  variable  in  relation  to  a  variable  set
highlights the arrow-breaking feature: an intervention on a cause variable would leave previous
variables  intact  (breaking  the  connection  between  variables  instead  of  changing  the  values  of
previous variables). Woodward attacks Lewis’ similarity criteria – which were intended to establish
the falsity of backtracking counterfactuals – with an example where a backtracking counterfactual
ends up true. In a complex scenario where a variable (C) generates several effects (E1...E5) at t1
and another effect (E*) at t2, intervening to see whether if E1…E5 had not happened E* would not
have happened either would involve five small miracles preventing E1…E5, which is a problem for
Lewis’ claim that widespread miracles and violations of laws should be avoided. Thus, if a small
miracle happens before C, that would involve a true backtracking counterfactual, namely that had
E1…E5  not  occurred,  C  would  not  have  occurred  (Woodward  2003:  139).3 By  contrast,
Woodward’s concept of intervention can handle this case without miracles or backtracking. Here,
2 One issue is whether Woodward’s account should be read as a theory of causation at all, see Popa (2015): section 1.2 
for a review and arguments in this sense.
3 See Glynn (2013) for a discussion of Woodward’s counterexamples and a comparison to Lewis.
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the similarity metric is rejected, while the interventionist apparatus accounts for similar types of
counterfactuals  to those discussed by Lewis being true in the context of causal inference. This is
analogous to Pearl’s approach that will be discussed below. 
Taking a broad perspective where causation is connected to counterfactuals on ontological or
epistemic grounds, it should be noted that for Lewis, as well as for cases when one reasons from
causes  to  effects  intervening  on  the  cause  to  change  the  value  of  the  effect  variable within
Woodward’s account, backtracking counterfactuals end up false. A clarification to make here is that
my  aim  is  not  to  criticize  causal  models  employing  non-backtracking  counterfactuals  for  the
purposes of causal inference. Rather, I seek to highlight additional concerns arising from the use of
a semantics of counterfactuals similar to that by Lewis. While Woodward focuses on cause-to-effect
inferences and does not provide truth conditions for all counterfactuals, questions arise as to why
this  particular  semantics  for  counterfactuals  is  appropriate  in  this  context,  and  how  it  can  be
connected to semantics where backtracking counterfactuals end up true. My argument can supply an
answer  to  the  former  question,  namely  that  from  the  perspective  of  the  causal  reasoner  non-
backtracking counterfactuals are easier to grasp. In relation to this, it is also worth noting that there
are philosophical approaches to causation that employ backtracking counterfactuals. For instance,
Broadbent  (2007,  2012)  argues  for  an  approach  that  accepts  the  truth  of  certain  backtracking
counterfactuals,  thus  handling  counterexamples  such  as  preemption  or  the  problem  of  the
transitivity of causation. Broadbent defends the truth of backtracking counterfactuals by rejecting
Lewis’  claim  about  counterfactual  dependence  being  asymmetric,  and  highlighting  that
counterfactual reasoning can be useful when applied to the past (e.g., when tracing details about the
origin of a certain event), and not only for predicting future effects (2012: 471-472). As my interest
here lies in psychological aspects, I will not go into the details of this approach. However, one thing
to point  out  is  that  Broadbent’s arguments  are  consistent  with both the formal  approaches that
accept  uses  of  backtracking,  as  well  as  with  the  psychological  findings  I  will  review  below
regarding using counterfactuals in different inference patterns. 
Having reviewed the philosophical background, and moving on to tracing the psychological
plausibility of the non-backtracking interpretation of counterfactuals, there are two subquestions to
clarify.  Firstly,  how can backtracking counterfactuals be made sense of formally? Secondly,  are
backtracking counterfactuals used when reasoning causally? And if so, what makes the use of non-
backtracking counterfactual preferable? For the remainder of this section I will address the former
subquestion, with the next two sections addressing the latter questions.
For my purposes here, I start by discussing the causal model for counterfactuals by Pearl
(2009)  stressing  that  even  though  Pearl  rejects  the  similarity  criteria,  his  view  presupposes  a
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semantics of counterfactuals similar to that of Lewis. The causal model approach by Pearl is thus
better suited to address previous objections raised against Lewis’ account (Starr 2019: 3.3). The
point regarding similar semantics is made by several authors, though there is also work highlighting
the differences. For instance, Skovgaard-Olsen et al. point out, ‘Pearl showed that it was possible to
derive the same conditional logics based on his structural semantics for counterfactuals as on Lewis’
account’ (2021: 75). Lassiter also describes Pearl’s view as follows: ‘theories of counterfactuals
built  around  causal  models  have  generally  taken  a  stronger  stance  [than  Lewis],  ruling  out
backtracking as part of the definition of intervention’ (2020: 13). Lassiter also notes other views as
exceptions, such as that by Hiddleston (2005) and Lucas and Kemp (2015) which I will discuss
below.  Regarding  divergences  from Lewis’ semantics,  Briggs  (2012)  points  out  that  there  are
differences both in truth conditions and regarding which inferences containing counterfactuals are
valid.  Briggs  further  argues that  extending Pearl’s  model  would yield  into  a  different  logic  of
counterfactuals.  I  will  not  explore  these  wider  debates  on semantics  here,  as  my interest  is  in
backtracking,  and  Briggs  notably  mentions  that  the  causal  models  he  discusses  apply  to  non-
backtracking counterfactuals (2012: 157).
Fisher (2017a) describes Pearl’s semantics of counterfactuals as strictly interventionistic in
contrast  with  that  of  Hiddleston  (2005)  and  Fisher  (2017b),  raising  an  issue  about  handling
backtracking.  Fisher  makes  this  point  in  a  semantic  context,  highlighting  that  the  epistemic
purposes of cause-to-effect inference that Pearl focuses on may not necessarily lead to the best
assessment of the truth values of counterfactuals in semantic context (2017b: footnote 22). I take
this point to be important in spelling out the problem: Pearl’s model can be viewed as answering a
specific concern about causal inference and in this sense it should not be taken as an account about
counterfactuals in general. Still, once the discussion moves to the question of assessing truth values
for counterfactuals, the Pearl model has difficulty with uses that involve backtracking. This can be
addressed by causal models that  encompass Pearl’s  approach alongside interventions that  allow
backtracking, or by integrating the interventionist model with other semantics of counterfactuals.
Before discussing such approaches, it is worth stressing that recent work by Pearl highlights three
layers of causal inference: the first based on statistical associations captured by Bayesian networks
which  can  incorporate  diagnostic  reasoning,  predictive  inference  through  intervention,  and
counterfactual  inference  (see  Pearl  and  MacKenzie  2018).  Thus,  insofar  as  the  causal  models
defended by Pearl are connected to Bayesian networks, ways of reasoning that involve prediction
can  be  integrated  with  diagnosis.  Regarding  models  integrating  different  semantics  for
counterfactuals, Schulz et al. (2019) use the critique raised in Fisher (2017a) as a starting point to
show  in  experimental  context  that  participants  would  accept  the  truth  of  backtracking
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counterfactuals such as ‘If the match lit, then if the match had not been struck it would not have lit’,
which would come out as false under Pearl’s account.4 Schulz et al. argue for an alternative notion
of intervention, that allows backtracking. Particularly, the latter account integrates Pearl’s views
within a broader approach to counterfactuals that includes backtracking.
Woodward’s  account  described above relies  on causal  models  by Pearl.  Particularly,  the
‘graph surgery’ feature, where an intervention leaves previous variables in the system unchanged, is
part of Pearl’s account. As mentioned above, although Lewis’ approach to counterfactuals relies on
the possible worlds semantics, the result with regard to the falsity of backtracking counterfactuals is
similar. Nevertheless, causal models involving counterfactuals can also take different forms. In a
model by Hiddleston (2005) the main idea behind interventions is to leave the network intact (thus,
not  cutting  the  causal  connections).  This  means  that  if  a  variable  A is  a  cause  of  variable  B,
intervening on B would amount to changing the value of A, since the causal connection between the
two is left intact. This would lead to the backtracking counterfactual ‘If B had not occurred, A
would not have occurred’ being true (see Illustration 1). Rips (2010) compares the two models by
Pearl and Hiddleston in experimental context. More recently, Lucas and Kemp (2015) introduced a
model that builds upon both Pearl’s and Rips’s approaches, and allows backtracking. Khoo (2017)
also defends a theory that allows both backtracking and non-backtracking counterfactuals.
4 On an interventionist reading, intervening to light the match would break the connection to its cause (striking it), 
thus the counterfactual ‘If the march lit, then if the match had not been struck, it would have lit’ would be true.
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Illustration 1: The pruning and the minimal network 
approaches. For the former, if component B is not 
working (illustrated in gray), component A continues to 
work, but the causal connection between the two is cut. 
For the latter, if component B is not working, component 
A is also not working (they are both in gray). Thus, on the






Given  that  formal  models  can  accommodate  both  backtracking  and  non-backtracking
counterfactuals for causal  thought,  the next question is  an empirical one: whether backtracking
counterfactuals are used in causal reasoning tasks. Before addressing this in the next section, one
last  thing  to  investigate  is  whether  there  are  any  particular  strengths  of  the  non-backtracking
interpretation. One source for this is Woodward’s (2014) functional account of causation, which
ascribes his model a normative dimension: interventionist counterfactuals provide a framework that
people ought to use when reasoning causally. Thus, on this view, one may claim that although both
backtracking  and  non-backtracking  interpretations  are  available  formally,  non-backtracking
counterfactuals  are  the  best  suited  for  cause-to-effect  inference.  Woodward  (2019)  justifies
normative models by an appeal to a means-ends relation: a feature of causal reasoning is assessed in
relation to its successful employment in the pursuit of a goal. Woodward focuses on manipulability
and  control  –  a  certain  means  of  inferring  causally  would  count  as  effective  if  it  enables  the
successful control  of relevant variables.  Woodward (2019) further discusses how the normative
connects  with  the  descriptive  in  relation  to  work  in  psychology  and  experimental  philosophy,
highlighting  the  importance  of  empirical  evidence.  From  this  framework,  interventionist
counterfactuals have the advantage of ruling out confounders, which is an important part of causal
knowledge. Still, the same functional perspective could also involve backtracking counterfactuals –
tracing the cause of a particular effect can be used in future tasks involving control. In what follows,
I will focus on descriptive aspects, namely how people  actually reason about causality and what
warrants the use of non-backtracking counterfactuals. Among other things, looking at time and the
perspective of the causal reasoner will help explain the ease of using interventionist counterfactuals.
3. Causal reasoning and counterfactuals: psychological research
Discussing  backtracking  in  the  context  of  psychological  research  requires  an  investigation  of
counterfactual thinking from a broader perspective. I will first look into a debate on conditional and
counterfactual  reasoning  in  developmental  context  which  will  be  relevant  for  my  subsequent
discussion of the normative approach mentioned above and related psychological accounts. I will
then look into evidence of backtracking in adults’ reasoning through causal models, highlighting
that  current  research  shows  that  people  do  not  abide  by  one  model  only,  or  employ  a  single
interpretation of counterfactuals. 
Reviews of developmental evidence converge on conditional reasoning emerging around the
age of 3, with counterfactual reasoning  starting at 6 years of age (Gautam et al. 2019; Roese &
Epstude 2017). However,  whether younger children are able to answer counterfactual questions
correctly has been subject to debate. Early work using stories told to children followed by questions
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about alternative turns of events suggested that counterfactual thought emerges between 3 and 5
years of age (Harris et al. 1996). These findings have been challenged, and explained through a
distinction  between  conditional  reasoning  and  counterfactual  reasoning:  younger  children  can
answer questions about conditional scenarios correctly,  while only children of 6 and above can
answer  the  counterfactual  questions  (Rafetseder  et  al.  2010).  This  involves  a  more  complex
structure of counterfactual thought, namely creating an alternative scenario and integrating it with
previous information (Rafetseder & Perner 2010). A debate between Weisberg and Gopnik (2013,
2015) and Beck (2015a, 2015b) focuses on whether counterfactuals  are  used earlier  or later in
development and whether counterfactual thinking is a continuous ability from early development to
adulthood. 
A more recent contrast is between work by McCormack et al. (2018) and Nyhout and Ganea
(2019). The  findings  from the  McCormack  et  al.  (2018)  study  cast  doubt  over  the  claim that
children under 6 can reason with counterfactuals. Given a scenario where a toy pig is toppled by
mechanisms operated by disks of different colors, with one disk reaching it earlier, only the children
over 6 were able to correctly say that had the first disk not been dropped, the pig would still have
been knocked over by the second one.5 This stands in contrast with findings by Nyhout and Ganea
(2019), who use a device playing a tune when activated by blocks of certain colors to show that 4
and 5-year  olds  can  answer  counterfactual  questions.6 The  point  of  contention  here  is  whether
children can reason with counterfactuals before the age of 6, and the answer is provided by their
success at the task.  One possible concern here is that the scenario from McCormack et al. (2018)
may be viewed as too complex for children to grasp, and as such it may not shed light on their
counterfacutal thinking. In response, I would like to point to further studies, like Rafetseder et al.
(2013),  using  simpler  scenarios  that  children  should  be  able  to  grasp,  but  do  not  answer
counterfactual questions correctly. The scenario by Rafetseder et al. (2013) involves a dwarf and a
squirrel searching for nuts. The dwarf can pick up the nuts falling into a tree hut, taking them to the
village, while the squirrel can pick up the nuts from the tree, taking them to the nest. Upon being
presented one of the scenarios,  say,  the nut is  in  the tree and the squirrel  is  picking it  up and
correctly answering that the nuts will be in the nest, the children are presented with a counterfactual
question: what if the dwarf had come to pick up the nut? Children below 6 would incorrectly say
that the nut would be in the village. 
Beck  and  Rafetseder  (2019)  explain  the  discrepancy  between  the  results  in  the  studies
above, as well as the split between views attributing counterfactual thought to younger or older
5 In the philosophical literature on causation this would count as a preemption scenario.
6 This falls into the blicket detector paradigm (see Gopnik and Sobel 2000).
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children through Hoerl and McCormack’s (2019) dual systems account of temporal updating and
temporal reasoning. For temporal reasoning, the child has to run a simulation of a past event, which
is required in the McCormack et al. (2018) study. By contrast, in Nyhout and Ganea (2019) the
screen still shows both blocks on top of the device and children have to only think of what would
happen if one of the blocks were removed. Beck and Rafetseder (2019) take this to involve merely
temporal  updating,  which  is  present  earlier  in  development.  While  one  may  object  that  the
preemption scenario may be too complex and thus not representative for assessing children’s causal
reasoning, the issue with the experiments in Nyhout and Ganea is that they do not require children
to consider things having gone differently in the past. 
Another  potential objection  here  is  that  the  Nyhout  and  Ganea  experiments  involve
counterfactual  reasoning  in  line  with  philosophical  treatments  of  counterfactuals.7 While  the
correspondence  between  the  experimental  work  in  psychology  and  philosophical  work  in
counterfactuals is an interesting question that could further help clarify this debate, it is beyond my
purposes here. I will sketch an answer that reasoning counterfactually in line with theories such as
that by Lewis requires a set of advanced abilities, notably distinguishing between mere hypothetical
reasoning and counterfactual thinking, and attributing these abilities to children below 6 should be
backed up by further empirical work. Research on temporal reasoning such as the one mentioned
above, for instance, suggests that relevant abilities emerge in older children. 
While  further  research  is  needed  in  developmental  context,  it  can  be  concluded  that
counterfactual reasoning emerges in childhood, with abilities easier to use by children emerging
earlier in development. The point of contention regarding whether counterfactuals are used earlier
rather than later and whether this is continuous with the use of counterfactuals in adulthood can be
placed in the broader context of causal maps and the use of Bayes networks (for instance Gopnik et
al. 2004; Schulz et al. 2007). Work on causal maps is consistent with normative approaches such as
Woodward’s (2014) above: children are said to follow certain rules for inference (including arrow-
breaking  interventions,  or  screening-off  in  probabilistic  causation)  which  yield  into  correct
judgments of causal structures, and also hold in adult causal cognition. Still, in the case of Bayesian
models of causal learning, both normative and descriptive aspects are involved, and such views
have been criticized for not clearly distinguishing between the two (Sloman & Fernbach 2008;
Fernbach & Sloman 2011; Jones & Love 2011). As Fernbach and Sloman point out, ‘violations of a
model’s predictions should be taken seriously and not explained away as due to the approximate
way  the  optimal  computation  is  implemented.  And  a  rational  analysis  does  not  demonstrate
7 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing up this point.
9
rationality if people do not abide by it’ (2011: 99). The authors further hold that more clarity about
the descriptive and normative claims would render Bayesian approaches more falsifiable. 
In  relation  to  the  problem  of  counterfactuals  and  causal  reasoning,  questions  whether
counterfactual thinking emerges earlier or later, and in accordance with a strictly interventionist
model or a different one can be settled empirically if the descriptive claims are made clear. For
instance, approaches such as Weisberg and Gopnik (2013) holding that counterfactual thinking is
continuous throughout development and employing models using non-backtracking counterfactuals,
do not explain how this relates to evidence of backtracking in adult reasoning.  A set of questions
emerges regarding where backtracking fits into this picture: is it simply an erroneous way of using
counterfactuals? Is it a more sophisticated means of reasoning acquired later? Is it an ability that
develops  parallel  to  that  of  making cause-to-effect  inferences?  Conceptual  contributions  on the
status of backtracking and causal reasoning such as the one sought by this article would help open
the  way  for  further  empirical  investigations  in  this  sense.  Particularly,  the  discussion  in  the
following section would suggest a negative answer to the first question above: it sometimes makes
sense  to  backtrack,  although  people  generally  employ  non-backtracking  counterfactuals  when
inferring causally.
By  contrast  with  the  developmental  debate  discussed  above,  the  ability  to  answer
counterfactual questions by adults is uncontroversial (Rafetseder et al. 2010, 2013). For instance, in
the  Rafetseder  et  al.  (2010)  study,  adults  had  no  problem  answering  counterfactual  questions
correctly. I will thus move on to the issue of backtracking. The study by Rips (2010) mentioned in
section 2 explores the Pearl (2000) and Hiddleston (2005) models of counterfactuals in empirical
setting, with the former excluding backtracking through the arrow-breaking feature, and the latter
allowing it in order to keep the network intact (see Illustration 1). The participants were asked
counterfactual questions about a system with different components,  some of which are causally
connected. In the case of a device where A causes B, the questions would be ‘If component B were
not operating, would A operate?’ and ‘If component A were not operating, would B operate?’ (Rips
2010: 184). A positive answer to the first question would be indicative of backtracking. According
to Rips’ discussion, Pearl’s model would predict that positive answers only are about the antecedent
(e.g., if A causes B, intervening on B would leave A intact). According to Hiddleston’s model, the
answer  should  be  negative  (i.e.,  the  network  is  left  intact,  and as  such  B not  operating  is  an
indication that A is also not operating). The results showed that people tend to backtrack, with
similar results obtained in Rips and Edwards (2013). This runs in contrast with previous studies,
such as Sloman and Lagnado (2005), that found a difference between observation and intervention:
observation  is  associated  with  diagnostic  reasoning  (thus,  involving  backtracking),  while
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intervention with causal reasoning (which falls in line with Pearl’s model). It is important to point
out that the questions and the task can be also interpreted in a different way: as respondents are only
told that a component would not operate, and do not know whether the component was prevented
from working by an intervention,  the task may appear  ambiguous,  with people interpreting the
workings  of  the  system in  different  ways.8 On  this  interpretation,  Rips  would  not  necessarily
challenge the Pearl model. Still, the point may be raised in relation to semantics of counterfactuals
that exclude backtracking (such as Lewis’) and their overlaps with interventionist causal models:
when faced with a choice between two interpretations, people do backtrack. Finding the conditions
under which they do so is of further empirical interest and explored in the studies reviewed below.
Gerstenberg et al. (2013) ran a new set of experiments on similar devices as in Rips (2010)
to shed further light on this. The significant finding is that people’s answers tend to backtrack when
asked about causes of the counterfactual state (thus falling in line with the Hiddleston’s minimal
network approach), but not when asked about the effect of the counterfactual state (thus falling in
line with Pearl’s pruning approach). Another finding is that people ‘process counterfactual questions
in a more local fashion rather than simultaneously considering the states of all  variables in the
system’ (Gerstenberg et al.  2013: 2390). This will be relevant for my subsequent discussion on
understanding counterfactuals and causality and on whether this understanding should be expected
to  fall  in  line  with  particular  models,  or  whether  people  think  of  causes  and  effects  without
considering an entire variable system.
Han et al. (2014) address one shortcoming in the studies above, namely that talking about
causality in the context of a device where components are represented as different variables may be
too abstract a task to capture how people reason causally. Han et al. used questions in relation to
various scenarios that would match the structure of the devices used in previous research (such as
common cause or common effect). Examples of counterfactual questions include ‘If John weren’t
drinking alcohol, then he wouldn’t have brought a gift’ and ‘If John weren’t drinking alcohol, then
he wouldn’t have acted wildly’ (Han et al 2014: 2430). While in the case of the latter the causal
connection between the antecedent and consequent is clear, the former makes sense for the causal
reasoner only if there is another cause involved, for instance, receiving an invitation to the party
would lead to both drinking alcohol and bringing a gift. The findings are interpreted by Han et al. as
people backtracking just in case they make the counterfactual conditional true. This explanation
runs in contrast with claims by Rips (2010), or Gerstenberg et al (2013) that link the use of different
counterfactuals  for explanation and inference,  with the former tied to  diagnostic  reasoning and
involving backtracking, and the latter following the order of causation that rules out backtracking.
8 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this point.
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Unlike these previous explanations, Han et al. (2014) focus on the entire counterfactual and not
only its antecedent, claiming that ‘backtracking counterfactuals can be considered a case of causal
belief revision determined by the structure of the situation’ (2014: 2434). This is in line with earlier
work by Dehghani et al. (2012) and Sloman and Walsh (2008). The contrast between the earlier
claim by Gerstenberg et al.  (2013) that people process counterfactual questions locally, and the
reference to the structure of the situation by Han et al. (2014) should be noted. Still, the two claims
are not completely incompatible, as the findings by Han et al. do not entail that people necessarily
assume an entire network in accordance with various causal models, and neither do Gerstenberg et
al.  The  issue at  stake appears  to  be what  kind of  structure they are considering  and how that
determines whether they will resort to backtracking or not.
Having reviewed the psychological evidence on counterfactual reasoning and backtracking,
one important finding to stress is that people’s judgments do not conform to solely one model, and
this should be taken into account when discussing causal reasoning in relation to the respective
models. Still, in the investigation of causal reasoning, especially in studies such as Rips (2010),
Rips and Edwards (2013), Gerstenberg et al. (2013) that involve a distinction between explanation
and inference, there is an assumption that at least in the context of reasoning from cause to effect,
counterfactuals should not backtrack. This appears to echo earlier philosophical preoccupations of
linking causation to non-backtracking counterfactuals reviewed in section 2. Given that formally
both types of counterfactuals can be true according to  different  models,  and that psychological
evidence has shown that people do sometimes backtrack,  the final question to ask is why non-
backtracking counterfactuals tend to appear more natural in relation to reasoning causally. In the
next section I provide an explanation of the preponderant use of non-backtracking counterfactuals
in causal contexts on the basis of how people experience causality. In doing so, I will rely on further
psychological work on mental simulation and causal thought.
4. Non-backtracking counterfactuals and the experience of causation
In will now provide an account of the usage of non-backtracking counterfactuals in causal thought. I
employ two arguments in this sense: an argument from mental simulation and an argument from the
experience of causality. The former holds that since mental simulation is often involved in causal
reasoning, and it includes information on the direction of time, the counterfactuals that end up being
connected to causation are those that follow the arrow of time. The latter will trace the use of non-
backtracking counterfactuals to causal understanding and its  connection to temporal succession.
One consequence  of  both arguments  is  that  the  use  of  non-backtracking counterfactuals  is  not
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necessarily normative: mental simulation is used as a heuristic, and the intuitive understanding of
causality  does  not  provide  sufficient  conditions  for  causal  inference.  As such,  the  use  of  non-
backtracking counterfactuals is not traced to their leading to better causal judgments as opposed to
backtracking ones, but to their usefulness in the light of the workings of human cognition and its
connection to the experience of time. Given that people can act to change the present or future and
not the past, the forward-looking causal connections are the most relevant for the situation of the
causal reasoner. Empirical work supporting these arguments includes developmental research on
causal  learning  and the  early  connection  between causation  and temporal  order,  with  the  later
connection to counterfactuals and their usage in adult  causal reasoning, and the employment of
mental simulation.
Before introducing the arguments,  the connection between causation and counterfactuals
previously  discussed  in  relation  to  the  philosophy  of  causation  should  also  be  traced  in
psychological  investigations.  While the studies reviewed above on counterfactual  thought could
help  draw negative  conclusions,  for  instance,  regarding  whether  it  makes  sense  to  look  for  a
connection between counterfactuals and causal learning in children under 6, the question whether
people connect causation and counterfactuals is addressed in different research. One such relevant
study was conducted by Gerstenberg et al. (2014), arguing that people’s causal judgments are linked
to counterfactual simulation. The participants were shown videos where two billiard balls would
collide with the second ball either passing through a gate or being prevented from doing so. Both
physical (a barrier) and non-physical (a teleport device) entities were involved in various scenarios.
Participants were shown causal blocks and counterfactual blocks: the causal blocks showed the
entire interaction while in the counterfactual blocks the video would stop at the time of collision.
The authors interpret the results as follows:
People make causal judgments by comparing what actually happened
with  what  they  think  would  have  happened  in  the  counterfactual
world in which the causal event of interest hadn’t taken place. They
use their intuitive understanding of the domain in order to simulate
what  would  have  happened  in  the  relevant  counterfactual  world
(Gerstenberg et al. 2014: 526).
Thus,  causal  reasoning in  adults  is  linked to  counterfactuals  understood according to  the  Pearl
model. Related work includes a counterfactual model for causal reasoning in relation to physical
events (Gerstenberg et al. 2015, 2020).
Having looked at empirical evidence regarding counterfactuals and causal cognition, I will
now articulate the arguments. The argument from mental simulation holds that non-backtracking
counterfactuals are employed in causal reasoning as part of the simulation heuristic. Given the wide
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use  of  this  heuristic  and  particularly  its  connection  to  causal  reasoning,  non-backtracking
counterfactuals are easier to employ for causal reasoners. Empirical evidence for this claim comes
from psychological studies on the causal asymmetry. In a review by Lagnado and Sloman (2015) a
section on the causal asymmetry concludes that ‘studies on the asymmetry of causal reasoning are
consistent with the idea that people are much better able to run mental simulations forward from
cause to effect than backward from effect to cause’ (3.16). Here, Lagnado and Sloman refer to
Tversky and Kahneman’s  (1974) earlier  considerations  on  mental  simulation,  including aspects
beyond  probabilistic  dependence,  particularly  spatio-temporal  information.9 While  Lagnado and
Sloman connect this to the geometrical-mechanical concept of causation, for the purposes of this
paper I will leave the debate between defenders of these positions open.10
Mental simulation has been investigated in connection to various domains in psychology
including decision making, self-regulation, memory, mental imagery, social cognition (Moulton &
Kosslyn 2009: 1275). This wide range of uses helps illustrate the scope of causal thought: people
simulate scenarios in order to make better choices, or to better navigate various social situations.
Counterfactual thought and simulation are also discussed in the context of neuroscience by Van
Hoeck  et  al.:  ‘simulations  provide  the  basis  for  constructing  mental  models  of  events  and  of
imaging alternative realities ‘‘if only’’ different decisions were made or actions taken’ (2015: 2).
One thing to stress here, though, is that mental simulation is a heuristic: a means of reasoning under
conditions of uncertainty, which may yield correct judgments, but which may also be prone to error
(Kahneman et al. 1982). In this sense, the contrast with approaches such as Bayesian models or
causal maps should be noted. As causal maps rely on means of inferring causally that yield the
correct causal structure, they would ascribe such methods to all causal reasoners. Still, as discussed
above, such methods of inference rule out backtracking counterfactuals. The heuristics approach,
and mental simulation in particular, presents a broader picture capturing the multitude of uses of
counterfactuals.  As  simulation  contains  information  on  temporal  order,  that  would  explain  the
preference  for  non-backtracking counterfactuals,  but  backtracking may  be  used  in  cases  where
temporal order may not be as important. One consequence of adopting this picture is giving up the
normative dimension that approaches such as Woodward (2014) have taken: people can and do
reason about causation in multiple ways, and some ways are better adjusted to their situations than
others.
The previous  point  brings  me to  the  argument  from the  experience  of  causality:  causal
reasoners  employ  preponderantly  non-backtracking  counterfactuals  because  they  match  their
9 Also see Kahneman (1995) for a discussion on counterfactuals specifically.
10 See Waldmann and Mayrhofer (2016) for a discussion of different concepts of causation in psychological context.
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understanding of causation, which involves the direction of time.  The conceptual account of the
asymmetry  of  causation  I  have  defended  elsewhere  emphasizes  the  early  connection  between
causality and time on the basis of psychological research on causal learning and causal reasoning
(Popa 2020). On this model, causal reasoners link claims such as ‘A causes B’ to claims such as ‘A
is temporally prior to B’. While this provides neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for causal
inference -  it  leaves  out  simultaneous causation and time alone is  a  weak cue to  causality  -  it
explains how further cues  to causality are  shaped by this  assumption,  particularly the temporal
asymmetry.  Under this model, counterfactuals would be among those cues, and their use would
presuppose an earlier understanding of causation in relation to time, and possibly other cues.
According to different studies, children rely on temporal succession in causal perception
starting with the age of 3 or 4 (Bullock et al.  1982; Ranking & McCormack 2013). Regarding
causal  reasoning,  5  to  6  years  old  can  infer  causal  structure  on  the  basis  of  temporal  cues
(McCormack  et  al.  2014).  Comparing  this  with  the  developmental  evidence  on  counterfactual
thought  shows that  children are able to  perceive causality and temporal succession before they
employ counterfactuals. Only evidence of the kind provided by Harris et al. (1996) could match this
age  range,  but  in  the  current  state  of  scholarship  no  study  has  disentangled  the  children’s
performance from their use of mere conditional reasoning. Regarding causal reasoning, if the age
when children can think counterfactually is 6, as several of the studies cited above converge on,
then the use of temporal cues also precedes it. 
One potential objection here would come from research attributing counterfactual thought to
children younger than 6. While this is currently an ongoing empirical debate, I would like to answer
it from the perspective of existing scholarship. If the difference is explained by reliance on temporal
updating,  and  temporal  reasoning  respectively  (McCormack  &  Hoerl  2019),  then  the  use  of
counterfactual  simulation  involves  temporal  reasoning,  which  in  turn  would  involve  an
understanding  of  succession.  As  such,  temporal  reasoning  would  be  one  crucial  step  in  the
development of counterfactual thought even if one were to identify developmental precursors such
as conditional reasoning. 
Moving on to adult causal reasoning, Lagnado and Sloman (2004) show that adults are more
successful at inferring causally when interventions are accompanied by temporal cues. This again
highlights the connection between causality and time, which facilitates causal reasoning even when
inferring through different cues. In sum, causality appears to be understood in temporal terms from
early on, and once causal thought is shaped by the understanding of time, counterfactual reasoning
assists in causal inference. Counterfactuals are employed from this frame because of the causal
reasoner’s experience and understanding of time.
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Having  explained  why  non-backtracking  counterfactuals  appear  to  be  the  right  kind  of
counterfactuals in the context of making causal judgments, I will use the remainder of this paper to
place the proposed account in philosophical perspective. As mentioned above, the aspects of human
cognition that render the employment of non-backtracking counterfactuals useful are not sufficient
to assume this interpretation as correct on objective grounds. By ‘objective grounds’, I mean a set of
truth conditions that make certain counterfactuals true, but not others. These would be required for
defending counterfactual  analyses  of  causation  alongside causal  realism.  Earlier  metaphysical
attempts to define causation through counterfactual dependence tied to a particular interpretation of
counterfactuals  as  non-backtracking  may  face  this  problem.  Because  non-backtracking
counterfactuals work in the context of running mental simulations, they appear as more natural to
use,  but  there is  nothing beyond human cognition that makes  it  so.  Nevertheless,  the approach
introduced here can be used in the metaphysics of causation by perspectival accounts: if causation is
understood in a perspectival way, then the situation of the causal reasoner is in a certain sense
constitutive  of  the  concept  of  causation.  Defending  a  counterfactual  approach  to  causation  on
perspectival grounds would explain the use of non-backtracking counterfactuals with reference to
the  experience  of  time  by  the  causal  reasoner,  with  the  arrow  of  time  determining  which
counterfactuals  are  true.  I  will  briefly  illustrate  this  in  relation  to  Price’s  (2007)  version  of
perspectivalism.
Price argues that the perspective of the decision maker is  constitutive of causation.  The
architecture  of  deliberation  is  characterized  by  Fixtures  and  Options  which  can  be  Known or
Knowable (2007: 275). Adding the agent’s temporal position to this, Price introduces the Fixed Past
Principle, which he takes to be a part of naive physics: events that happened in the past are taken to
be Fixtures and thus cannot be acted upon (2007: 277). This view, however, does not exclude the
possibility of ‘an atemporal god, able to wiggle the material  world in a much less temporally-
constrained manner’ (2007:  280).  This,  however  would do away with the concept  of causation
according to Price, since such intervention would change everything, making it impossible to single
out particular causal connections. 
Placing the main claims of this paper in the context of Price’s perspectivalism would shed
more light on the causal reasoner’s temporal positioning and on how that relates to causal thought.
Price does not discuss counterfactuals, but as long as counterfactuals may be used in causal thought
they  would  fall  under  the  same  perspective.  Thus,  for  the  deliberation  situation  it  is  the
counterfactuals that go from past to future that are relevant, since one can only act to change the
future. Furthermore, the use of mental simulation in decision making, as discussed by Kahneman
and Tversky (1981), would help sketch out the relevant psychological aspects of mental simulation
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and decision making. As this is used as a heuristic, however, the absence of an objective guarantee
for its success should be emphasized.
This brings me to the question of normativity.  As argued above, using non-backtracking
counterfactuals can be justified by the causal reasoner’s experience of causation and time, but this
justification is subjective at best. Thus, the norms are adjusted to the causal reasoner’s situation – if
the counterfactuals are meant to be used for decision making, then following the arrow of time
would be the most useful strategy. However, if reasoning takes place within a particular system
where connections cannot be altered, then backtracking would make sense. Likewise, if the aim is
diagnostic,  then  backtracking  would  work  again.  Thus,  rather  than  relying  on  a  semantics  of
counterfactuals that excludes backtracking as a norm, further specifications of where and when such
methods are more effective are needed. This would also undermine a more ambitious project of
expanding a non-backtracking interpretation of counterfactuals to all areas of causal thought.
6. Conclusion
This  paper  has  explored  investigations  of  counterfactuals,  causation,  and  backtracking  across
philosophy  and  psychology.  I  have  traced  the  focus  on  non-backtracking  counterfactuals  to
philosophical approaches to causation and noted its subsequent use by normative and psychological
models,  arguing that  there  are  no  formal  or  empirical  reasons to  exclude  backtracking.  I  have
brought forward an explanation of the use of non-backtracking counterfactuals in the context of
making  a  causal  judgment  through  the  mental  simulation  heuristic  and  people’s  experience  of
causation. This view can be of further use in providing projectivist approaches in philosophy with
psychological support in explaining how the situation of the causal reasoner shapes causal concepts.
This  approach  helps  move  forward  the  debate  on  causation  and  counterfactuals  by
highlighting  the  need  to  shift  the  focus  from  justifying  the  employment  of  exclusively  non-
backtracking  counterfactuals  to  exploring  contexts  where  different  types  of  counterfactuals  are
salient. At the same time, the proposed account helps shed further light on how people ordinarily
use counterfactuals in causal contexts and decision making. This can inform future studies on the
functions of causal and counterfactual thought, involving both conceptual and empirical work in
developmental psychology and reasoning, among others. 
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